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Abstract
Efficient Protocols for Multi-Party Computation
by
Tahereh Jafarikhah
Adviser: Professor Rosario Gennaro
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) allows a group of parties to compute a joint
function on their inputs without revealing any information beyond the result of the compu-
tation. We demonstrate secure function evaluation protocols for branching programs, where
the communication complexity is linear in the size of the inputs, and polynomial in the
security parameter. Our result is based on the circular security of the Paillier encryption
scheme. Our work followed the breakthrough results by Boyle et al. [9; 11]. They pre-
sented a Homomorphic Secret Sharing scheme which allows the non-interactive computation
of Branching Programs over shares of the secret inputs. Their protocol is based on the Deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman Assumption. Additionally, we offer a verification technique to directly
check correctness of the actual computation, rather than the absence of a potential error as
in [9]. This results in fewer repetitions of the overall computation for a given error bound.
We also use Paillier’s encryption as the underlying scheme of publicly perceptual hashing.
Perceptual hashing allows the computation of a robust fingerprint of media files, such that
the fingerprint can be used to detect the same object even if it has been modified in per-
ceptually non-significant ways (e.g., compression). The robustness of such functions relies
on the use of secret keys both during the computation and the detection phase. We present
examples of publicly evaluatable perceptual hash functions which allow a user to compute
the perceptual hash of an image using a public key, while only the detection algorithm will
use the secret key. Our technique can be used to encourage users to submit intimate images
v
to blacklist databases to stop those images from ever being posted online – indeed using a
publicly evaluatable perceptual hash function the user can privately submit the fingerprint,
without ever revealing the image. We present formal definitions for the security of perceptual
hash, a general theoretical result that uses Fully Homomorphic Encryption, and a specific
construction using Paillier’s encryption. For the latter we show via extensive implementa-
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
More and more data is collected via people’s use of the internet and smartphones. The
benefit of collecting data is that one can compute on the data. For example, a study on
collected medical data allows researchers to predict the trend of people’s health. Another
example is collecting data to target advertisements. Analyzing collected tax data for fraud
detection is another example of useful computation on data. But can we control how our
information is used? On one hand, we are interested in the benefits of data harvest, on the
other hand, we are concerned about the privacy of our data and the unintended use. Law
enforcement alone is not enough to prevent privacy breaches.
Encryption can add a layer of data protection. By encrypting the data before collecting it,
privacy is guaranteed even if the database is hacked. However, once encrypted, intuitively
one no longer can compute on the data and the initial idea of data collection is gone.
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is a cryptographic technique that allows a group of
parties to compute a joint function on their input without revealing any information beyond
the result of the computation.
1
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MPC has a long history in the cryptographic literature, with origins in the early 1980s work
of Yao. It is a very powerful tool, since most, if not all of the security problems can be solved
in principle using a multiparty computation protocol.
From the early theoretical discovery in the 1980s till now, MPC has attracted many re-
searchers’ attention due to its potential in practice. MPC is relevant in cases where com-
putation on sensitive data is needed and there is no trusted third party to carry out the
computation. Some potential algorithms to apply MPC are as follows: Ranking algorithm
(e.g., credit rating in banking systems), regression algorithm (e.g., stock prediction), match-
ing algorithm (e.g., movie recommendation), classification algorithm (e.g., spam filtering),
and anomaly detection algorithm (e.g., intrusion detection).
Security is often defined using a simulation paradigm, where a protocol is said to be secure if
there exists a polynomial-time simulator that takes as input the output of the computation
and produces a protocol transcript (the views of each participant) such that any view is
indistinguishable from the transcript created by a real execution of the protocol. The initial
protocols established the feasibility of the solutions, and at the same time highlighted their
complexity. The research of the last 30 years has been focused on inventing increasingly
powerful MPC techniques to get more efficient solutions. One of the bottleneck parameters
that immediately attracted researchers’ attention was communication complexity: all the
early results require communication between the parties which is at least as large as the size
of the circuit representing the function being computed. Ideally one would like the parties
to exchange just a few messages of limited size. Here we will review the main approaches
for secure MPC as follows:
• Early approaches:
– Yao’s garbled circuit
– Linear secret sharing
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• Recent approaches:
– Homomorphic secret sharing
– Fully homomorphic encryption
This review prepares the ground for the method we worked on and its advantage over
the other approaches.
1.2 Approaches for Secure MPC
1.2.1 Yao’s Garbled Circuit
Secure MPC was introduced by Yao’s millionaire’s problem. With a 2-party Yao’s Garbled
Circuit (GC) protocol, the function is represented by a Boolean circuit. Then the generator
(Ginny), and the evaluator (Evan), participate in a protocol to obfuscate all the Boolean
gate truth tables. For example, to garbled u ∧ v gate to figure out the conjunction of two
bits without revealing anything else to one another we do the following steps:
• Garbled Gate Generation: Ginny picks four random labels: K0U , K1U , K0V and K1V .
K0U corresponds to the event that u = 0, and K
1
U corresponds to the event that u = 1.
Similarly, K0V corresponds to the event that v = 0, and K
1
V corresponds to the event
that v = 1 as it is illustrated in figure 1.1.
Ginny then uses every pair of labels corresponding to a possible scenario ((u = 0, v =
0), (u = 0, v = 1), (u = 1, v = 0) and (u = 1, v = 1)) to encrypt the output correspond-
ing to that scenario. The two relevant labels are used as the secret key to encrypt
u ∧ v. The garbled gate consists of the four resulting ciphertexts, in a random order.
The garbling of an AND gate is illustrated in table 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: And Gate
u v v ∧ v Garbled output




















Table 1.1: The Garbling of an AND Gate.
• Garbled Gate Evaluation: Once Evan receives the garbled gate, he needs to decrypt
exactly one ciphertext: the one corresponding to the real values u and v, encrypted
with KuU and K
v





Since Ginny knows u, she can send Evan KuU . The labels are all random, independent,
and identically distributed, so Evan won’t learn anything about u from KuU . However,




V to Evan, because
that will allow Evan to decrypt two ciphertexts in the garbled gate. Similarly, Evan
can’t simply ask for the one he wants, because he does not want Ginny to learn v.
So, Ginny and Evan use oblivious transfer (OT), which allows Evan to learn only KvV





-OT where one secret is chosen
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from two shares.
Figure 1.2: Oblivious Transfer.
• From Gates to Circuits In reality, Ginny and Evan might each have multiple input
bits, and they might want to compute a more complicated function. So, Ginny garbles
the entire function circuit gate by gate. For gates whose output serves as input to other
gates, instead of encrypting the output bit, she will encrypt a label corresponding to
the output bit. That label will then be used to derive a key for the decryption of
ciphertexts in other gates. Finally, by giving the translation Kbw → b to the output
wire of the final gate, we can get the output of the circuit.
More formally the garbling scheme is defined as follows:
Definition 1.2.1. Four polynomial-time algorithms (G,Enc,Eval,Dec) forms a garbling
scheme as follows:
1. G(1λ, f) → (F, e, d): The garbling algorithm G takes in the security parameter λ and
a circuit f, and returns a garbled circuit F, encoding information e, and decoding in-
formation d.
2. Enc(e, x)→ X: The encoding algorithm Enc takes in the encoding information e and
an input x and returns a garbled input X.
3. Eval(F,X)→ Y : The evaluation algorithm Eval takes in the garbled circuit F and the
garbled input X and returns a garbled output Y .
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4. Dec(d, Y ) → y: The decoding algorithm Dec takes in the decoding information d and
the garbled output Y and returns the plaintext output y.
A garbling scheme G is correct if for all sufficiently large security parameter λ, for all
functions f, and inputs x,
Pr[(F, e, d)← G(1λ, f) : Dec(d,Eval(F,Enc(e, x))) = f(x)] = 1.
Yao’s protocol is secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries who follow the pro-
tocol but attempt to learn information by analyzing the transcript of messages during the
execution.
1.2.2 Linear Secret Sharing
A secret sharing protocol allows a dealer to break a secret value into shares and distribute
these shares to a group of recipients with the property that any unqualified set of recipients
learns nothing about the secret, while any qualified set of recipients can reconstruct the
secret from their shares. A linear secret sharing scheme (LSS) such as Shamir’s is a special
type of secret sharing scheme where all the shares of the secret satisfy a linear relationship.
Shamir proposed a (t, n) threshold scheme that splits a secret s ∈ S into shares, which
are distributed to users. Splitting is done by a dealer using an algorithm called the share
generation algorithm. The algorithm uses a polynomial f(x) of degree t − 1 to generate
and distribute shares. The secret is reconstructed based on interpolating a polynomial using
Lagrange interpolation, which is a reconstructed by users. The users combine their shares
to reconstruct a polynomial f ′(x) of degree t using reconstruction algorithm. So, knowing
at least t shares is needed for reconstruction. The algorithm inputs the user’s identity i
and their share si, which forms an ordered pair (i, si) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , t and outputs the
secret f ′(0) = s. However, the scheme cannot withstand cheating if there is an untrusted
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user during secret reconstruction. As a result, many schemes with cheating prevention
are proposed where some detect cheating, others identify cheaters, and so on. one of the
drawbacks of secret sharing schemes is the high communication complexity as we need a lot
of interaction for the computation.
1.2.3 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is viewed as a dream way in cryptography to perform
a computation of an arbitrary function securely by allowing one to compute over encrypted
data without the decryption key. So given encryptions Enc(m1), . . . , Enc(mn) of m1, . . . ,mn,
one can efficiently compute a ciphertext that encrypts f(m1, . . . ,mn) for any efficiently com-
putable function f. So in addition to the three conventional algorithms (KeyGen,Enc,Dec),
there is an efficient algorithm Eval that takes as an input the public key, the representation
of the function, and a tuple of ciphertext (c1, . . . , cn) and outputs a ciphertext c such that if
ci encrypts mi then c encrypts f(m1, . . . ,mn). A quick view of FHE is as follows:
x
Enc−−→ Enc(x) EvalP−−−→ Enc(P (x)) Dec−−→ P (x)
However, despite great progress in the past years, even the most recent implementations
of FHE are still quite slow. This is due in part to the limited set of lattice-based assumptions
and the fact that large ciphertexts and keys are generated. As a result, it is arguably hard
to find realistic application scenarios in which current FHE implementations outperform
optimized versions of classical secure computation techniques such as garbled circuits when
taking both communication and computation costs into account.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
1.2.4 Homomorphic Secret Sharing
Homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) is an alternative approach that provides some of the
functionality of FHE. The high-level idea is that for some applications, the traditional notion
of FHE can be relaxed by allowing the homomorphic evaluation to be distributed among two
parties who do not interact with each other. A 2-party HSS scheme randomly splits an input
x into a pair of shares (x0, x1) such that: each share xb computationally hides x, and there
exists a polynomial-time local evaluation algorithm Eval such that for any “program” P (e.g.,
a boolean circuit, or branching program), the output P (x) can be additively reconstructed
from Eval(x0, P ) and Eval(x1, P ).
The output of Eval needs to be compact in the sense that its length depends only on the
output length |P (x)| but not on the size of P . A unique feature of HSS is that the output
can be reconstructed additively: Eval(x0, P )+Eval(x1, P ) = P (x) mod β for some positive
integer β ≥ 2 that can be chosen arbitrarily. This enables an ultimate level of compactness
and efficiency of reconstruction that is impossible to achieve via standard FHE. For instance,
if P outputs a single bit and β = 2, then P (x) is reconstructed by taking the XOR of two
bits. We can visualize a 2-party HSS scheme as showed in figure 1.3. In comparison to FHE,
each party does the computation locally without any interaction and at the end, we can
decryption without the need of a secret key. Of course, to establish any HSS protocol, we
need at least two non-colluding parties.
Figure 1.3: 2-party HSS.
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The ultimate optimal compactness feature enables applications in which the communica-
tion and computation costs of output reconstruction need to be minimized. The low commu-
nication feature of HSS also enables applications in which the parties want to generate large
amounts of correlated randomness. Generating such correlated randomness non-interactively
provides good protection against traffic analysis attacks that try to obtain information about
the identity of the interacting parties, the time of the interaction, and the size of the com-
putation that is about to be performed. Other advantages of group-based HSS over existing
FHE implementations include smaller keys and ciphertexts and a lower start-up cost. HSS
enables secure computation protocols that simultaneously offer a minimal amount of inter-
action and collision resistance. For instance, following a reusable setup, such protocols can
involve a single message from each “input client” to each server, followed by a single message
from each server to each “output client.” Alternatively, the servers can just publicize their
shares of the output if the output is to be made public. The security of such protocols holds
even against semi-honest adversaries who may corrupt an arbitrary subset of parties that
includes only one of the two servers.
In [9], authors presented a homomorphic secret sharing scheme for branching programs
based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, with output group Z2 (or any other Zp).
The scheme only satisfies a relaxed form of the correctness requirement where the additive
reconstruction of the output may fail with probability δ. Note that branching programs
capture many useful real-life computations. In particular, a branching program of size S can
simulate any Boolean formula of size S or Boolean circuit of depth log2 S, and polynomial-size
branching programs can simulate any computation in the complexity classes NC1 or (non-
uniform) deterministic log-space. The proposed HSS scheme admits a public-key variant,
which enables homomorphic computations on inputs that originate from multiple clients. In
this variant, there is a common public key pk and two secret evaluation keys (ek0, ek1). Each
input xi can now be separately encrypted using pk into a ciphertext ci , such that ci together
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with a single evaluation key ekb do not reveal xi . The homomorphic evaluation can now
apply to any set of encrypted inputs, using only the ciphertexts and one of the evaluation
keys. That is, Eval(ek0, (c1, . . . , cn), P ) + Eval(ek1, (c1, . . . , cn), P ) = P (x) mod β.
1.3 Review of the Contribution
In chapter 2, we review some cryptographic concepts and primitives we use later through-
out this thesis.
In chapter 3, we present a new protocol for low-communication MPC. Our protocol is be
based on the circular security of the Paillier encryption scheme [40]. Our work was inspired
by the results in [9; 11]. We also offer a few optimizations to the scheme, including an alter-
native to the “Las Vegas”-style share conversion protocols of [9; 11] which directly checks the
correctness of the computation. This allows us to reduce the number of required repetitions
to achieve a desired overall error bound by a constant fraction for typical cases, and for large
programs, reduces the total computation cost. The results of this chapter are joint work
with Rosario Gennaro, originally presented in [20].
Chapter 4 contains results on publicly evaluatable perceptual hash functions. Perceptual
hashing allows the computation of a robust fingerprint of media files, such that the finger-
print can be used to detect the same object even if it has been modified in perceptually
non-significant ways (e.g., compression). The robustness of such functions relies on the use
of secret keys both during the computation and the detection phase. We present examples of
publicly evaluatable perceptual hash functions which allow a user to compute the perceptual
hash of an image using a public key, while only the detection algorithm will use the secret
key. Our technique can be used to encourage users to submit intimate images to blacklist
databases to stop those images from ever being posted online; Indeed using a publicly eval-
uatable perceptual hash function the user can privately submit the fingerprint, without ever
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 11
revealing the image. We present formal definitions for the security of perceptual hash, a gen-
eral theoretical result that uses Fully Homomorphic Encryption, and a specific construction
using Paillier’s encryption. For the latter we show via extensive implementation tests that
the cryptographic overhead can be made minimal, resulting in a very efficient construction.
The results of this work are joint work with Rosario Gennaro, originally appeared in [22].
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we recall the cryptographic primitives that we are going to need later on.
A negligible function ν : N → R is a function that approaches zero asymptotically
faster than any inverse polynomial; for any polynomial p, ν(n) < 1/p(n) for all but finitely
many n.
For a distribution D, we denote by x← D the fact that x is being sampled according to D.
An ensemble χ = {Xn}n∈N is a family of probability distributions over a family of domains
D = {Dn}n∈N.
Two distributions {Dn}n∈N and {D′n}n∈N are computationally indistinguishable and
denoted by Dn ≈ D′n, if the behavior of an efficient adversary does not significantly change
when given sample according to Dn or D
′
n. More formally, for any PPT A, there is a
negligible function ν such that
|Prx∈Dn [A(x) = 1]− Prx∈D′n [A(x) = 1]| = ν(n)
. A pseudorandom function (PRF) is a family of functions with the property that the
input-output behavior of a random instance of the family is computationally indistinguish-
12
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able from that of a random function. More precisely,
Definition 2.0.1. Let F : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be an efficient length-preserving keyed
function family. We say F is a PRF if for all PPT distinguisher D, there is a negligible
function ν such that
Pr|[DFk(.)(1n) = 1]− Pr|[Df(.)(1n) = 1] ≤ ν(n)|
where k ← {0, 1}n and f is chosen uniformly at random from a set of functions mapping
n-bit strings to n-bit strings.
A public-key encryption system Π consists of three algorithms (KeyGen,Enc,Dec),
where KeyGen is a key generation (randomized) algorithm that takes a security parameter
1n and outputs a public-secret key pair (PK, SK); Enc(PK,m) is the encryption randomized
algorithm that on input a message m and the public key PK outputs a ciphertext c; and
Dec(SK, c) decrypts ciphertext c with secret key SK. So, if (PK, SK) ← KeyGen(1n) and
c← Enc(PK,m) then m = Dec(SK, c).
Semantic Security: [28] says that no polynomial time adversary can distinguish between
the encryption of two messages of its choice. More formally, for all probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) adversary A
Pr[b′ = b :(PK, SK)← KeyGen(1n), (m0,m1)← A(PK),
b← {0, 1}, b′ ← AOb(PK)] ≤ 1
2
+ ν(n)
where oracle Ob takes no input and outputs c ← Enc(PK,mb), and ν(n) is a negligible
function.
Circular Security: A public-key encryption Π is circular secure if it remains secure
even encrypting messages that depend on the secret keys in use. In particular, it remains
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secure under a key cycle usage. More precisely, if c with length(c) = l(n) is the secret key of
the public key encryption scheme Π which encrypts bits, there is a negligible function ν(n)
that the following holds for all PPT A:
Pr[b′ = b : (PK, SK)← KeyGen(1n), b← {0, 1}, b′ ← AOb(PK)] ≤ 1
2
+ ν(n)
where oracle O takes no input and outputs (D1, D2, . . . , Dl) such that
∀i ∈ [l], Di ← Enc(PK, 0) if b = 0
∀i ∈ [l], Di ← Enc(PK, SKi) if b = 1
in which SKi is the i-th bit of SK. Later we will see that circular security plays an
important role in the construction of our homomorphic secret sharing. We remark that
circular security implies semantic security.
2.1 Paillier Encryption
An encryption scheme is said additively homomorphic if it allows computation of affine func-
tions over encrypted inputs. Examples include [28], where the plaintext values are elements
of Z2, Paillier [41], with plaintext set ZN for an RSA modulus N , and the generalizations
by Damg̊ard and Jurik [18; 32] which work over ZNs for any positive integer s.
Let N be an RSA modulus, i.e. N = pq where p, q are primes. A number z is said to be an
N-th residue modulo N2 if there exists a number y ∈ Z×N2 such that z = y
N mod N2. We
assume that there exists no polynomial-time distinguisher for N -th residues mod N2. We
will refer to this hypothesis as the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA).
More formally, we assume that there exists a randomized RSA key generation algorithm
KeyGenRSA that on input a security parameter 1
n selects two n-bit primes. Then we say
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that the DCRA holds if for all PPT A there exists a negligible function ν(n), such that
Pr[b′ = b :(p, q)← KeyGenRSA(n), N = pq, b← {0, 1},
b′ ← AOb(N)] ≤ 1
2
+ ν(n)
where oracle Ob takes no input, selects y uniformly at random in Z×N2 and outputs z such
that z = y if b = 0, and z = yN if b = 1.
The Paillier encryption scheme [41; 18; 32], whose security is based on DCRA is defined as
follows.
• The key generation algorithm KeyGenPaillier(1n) picks two n-bit prime numbers p and
q such that N = pq satisfies gcd(N,ϕ(N)) = 1. This property is assured with high
probability if both primes are of equal length. Then the algorithm computes the least
common multiple of p− 1 and q − 1; λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1) = ϕ(N)/ gcd(p− 1, q − 1)
and outputs (PK, SK) for PK = N and SK = λ.
• The encryption algorithm for a message m ∈ ZN is defined by
EncPaillier(PK,m) = (1 +N)
m · rN mod N2
.
• The decryption algorithm for c < N2 is defined by
DecPaillier(SK, c) =
L(cλ mod N2)





Note that this scheme is additively homomorphic.
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Given only the public-key and ci = EncPaillier(mi) then c1 · c2 mod N2 = EncPaillier(m1 +








and outputs (PK, SK) for PK = N and SK = λ. Note that the existence of such a λ, as well
as an efficient means of computing it, are given by the Chinese Remainder Theorem since
(N,ϕ(N)) = 1. Note also that λ is unique in the range [0, . . . , Nϕ(N)− 1].
2.2 Homomorphic Secret Sharing
A 2-out-of-2 homomorphic secret sharing scheme [9] deals with the scenario that a client
wants to split a secret input w ∈ {0, 1}n into shares (w0, w1), and sends each wi to a
different server. Each server holding a representation of a function f , can locally compute
additive shares of f(w).
A representation for a function is a program P (a collection of bit strings). For an input
w ∈ {0, 1}n , the output of P is represented by P (w). The symbol ⊥ is used when the output
of P (w) is undefined. For simplicity we can consider the inputs and outputs of a function as
binary strings. A HSS scheme consists of two algorithms: Share that splits the secret into
two shares and Eval that evaluates a program P on two inputs such that the outputs are the
additive shares of P (w).[8; 10] In the following we see the formal definition.
Definition 2.2.1. A homomorphic secret sharing scheme with error bound δ for the collec-
tion of programs P consists of algorithms (Share,Eval) with the following properties:
• Share(1k, w): on the security parameter 1k and w ∈ {0, 1}n outputs (w0, w1).
• Eval(b ∈ {0, 1} , wb, P, δ) outputs yb.
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• Correctness: For every polynomial p there exists a negligible function ν such that for
every k, w, P, δ in which |P |, 1/δ ≤ p(k)
Pr[y0 + y1 = P (w) :(w0, w1)← Share(1k, w),
yb ← Eval(b, wb, P, δ), b ∈ {0, 1}] ≥ 1− δ − ν(k)
• Security: Each share computationally hides the secret input.
A stronger version of HSS that allows homomorphic computation on encrypted inputs is
as follows.
Definition 2.2.2. A Distributed-Evaluation Homomorphic Encryption (DEHE) with error
bound δ for a class of programs P consists of three algorithms (KeyGen,Enc,Eval) as follows:
• (PK, (e0, e1))← KeyGen(1k): It takes a security parameter 1k and outputs a PK and a
pair of evaluation keys (e0, e1).
• Ew := Enc(PK, w): It encrypts a secret input bit w and output c.
• Evalb := Eval(b ∈ {0, 1} , eb, c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn), P, δ): Outputs yb as party b’s share of
output y.
• Correctness: For every polynomial p there exists a negligible function ν such that for
every k, w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ {0, 1}n , P, δ in which |P |, 1/δ ≤ p(k)
Pr[y0 + y1 = P (w) :(PK, (e0, e1))← KeyGen(1k),
C ← (Ew1 , . . . , Ewn), yb ← Evalb] ≥ 1− δ − ν(k)
• Security: Let Db stand for the distribution obtained by applying the evaluation key eb
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in this setting. The security of the DEHE scheme means that D0 and D1 are compu-
tationally indistinguishable.
2.3 Restricted Multiplication Straight-line Programs
Restricted multiplication straight-line programs (RMS) differ from conventional straight-
line programs in that they do not allow the product of the contents of two registers to be
computed explicitly. More precisely, the class of RMS programs with bound 1M (where M is
an upper bound for the size of a memory location) is an arbitrary sequence of the instructions
as follow:
1. Load an input x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n into memory: yj ← xi.
2. Add memory locations: yk ← yi + yj.
3. Multiply a memory location by an input: yk ← xi · yj.
4. Output a memory location: Oj ← yj.
Whenever the size of a memory value exceeds M , the program aborts and outputs ⊥. We
define the size of an RMS program as the number of its instructions. As pointed out in [9]
RMS programs can be used to evaluate branching programs with constant overhead. The
length of an RMS program is the number of statements it contains. Our construction of the
HSS scheme in chapter 3, will provide non-interactive evaluation of these specific collection
of programs that captures LogSpace functions.
2.4 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
At a high level, a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [23] is an encryption scheme
that allows the computation of arbitrary functions over encrypted inputs. More specifically
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 19
given ciphertexts that encrypt m1, . . . ,mt, fully homomorphic encryption should allow any-
one (not just the key-holder) to output a ciphertext that encrypts f(m1, . . . ,mt) for any
desired function f , as long as the function can be efficiently computed. No information
about m1, . . . ,mt, or any other intermediate plaintext value should leak; the input, output,
and intermediate values are always encrypted. Formally, a public key encryption scheme
E = [KeyGenE ,EncE ,DecE ], is fully homomorphic if there is an additional algorithm EvalE
that takes as input the public key PK, a circuit C from a permitted set CE of circuits, and
a tuple of ciphertexts Ψ =< ψ1, . . . , ψt >; it outputs a ciphertext ψ. The computational
complexity of EvalE must be polynomial in security parameter 1
n and the size of C. The min-
imal requirement is correctness. E is correct for circuits in CE if, for any key-pair (SK,PK)
output by KeyGenE(1
n), any circuit C ∈ CE , any plaintexts m1, ...,mt, and any ciphertexts
Ψ =< ψ1, . . . , ψt > with ψi ← EncE(PK,mi), it is the case that:
ψ ← EvalE(PK,C,Ψ)⇒ C(m1, . . . ,mt) = DecE(SK,ψ)
2.5 Proofs of Knowledge:
Suppose that a prover P wants to convince a verifier V that he knows something without
revealing the information. This state is dealt using zero-knowledge proofs. The fundamental
notion of zero-knowledge was introduced by Goldwasser at al. in [29]. They considered
a setting where a powerful prover is proving a theorem to a probabilistic polynomial-time
verifier. Intuitively, a proof is considered zero-knowledge if whatever the verifier can compute
while interacting with the prover it can compute without going through the protocol. This
is captured by the notion of simulation: V ∗ (a dishonest verifier) could simulate a protocol
transcript by himself which is indistinguishable from a real transcript that would occur in
an actual protocol execution between P and V ∗. A protocol (P, V ) is zero-knowledge if for
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every efficient program V ∗ there exists an efficient program S, the simulator, such that the
output of S is indistinguishable from a transcript of the protocol execution between P and
V ∗ . If the indistinguishability is perfect, i.e., the probability distribution of the simulated
and the actual transcript are identical, then the protocol is called perfect zero-knowledge.
Note that by relaxing the requirement in a way that two distributions V iewV ∗ and S(x, z)
instead of being identical, they cannot be told apart by efficient computation we have com-
putational zero-knowledge.
More formally, let Q(·, ·) be a polynomial time computable predicate over two inputs.
On a public input x a Prover, wants to prove to a Verifier that he knows a “witness” w,
i.e., a string such that Q(x,w) = 1. He wants to do this without revealing any information
about w. The following definition [29; 21], captures what we need.
Definition 2.5.1. An interactive protocol (P, V ) is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for
a relationship Q if the following holds:
• Completeness: V running on input x accepts when interacting with P running on
input x, y such that Q(x, y) = 1
• Soundness: There exists an efficient program K, called knowledge extractor, with the
following property. For any P ∗ which makes V accept on input x, with non-negligible
probability, K with oracle access to P ∗ will output (with overwhelming probability) a y
such that Q(x, y) = 1.
• Zero-Knowledge: For any PPT verifier V ∗ running on input x and any additional
auxiliary information aux there exists an expected PPT simulator S such that ∀x ∈
L, z ∈ {0, 1}∗ ,
V iewV ∗ [P (x)↔ V ∗(x, aux)] ≈ S(x, aux)
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The V iew of the Verifier is defined as the transcript of the interaction with P and the
coin tosses used by the Verifier. With ≈ we define any of the notions of indistinguishability
in [29].
Note that the Soundness condition enforces that we can extract the witness w when using
P ∗ as an oracle. Therefore, it guarantees that if P ∗ convinces V then he must “know” w.
Also the Zero-Knowledge condition guarantees that the interaction is simulatable even
without knowing the secret witness w and therefore the verifier (no matter if honest or




This chapter was inspired by the recent results in [9; 11]. The authors presented low-
communication MPC protocols. Their scheme is proven secure under the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman Assumption (DDH). We extend their results and present new protocols for non-
interactive HSS scheme based on the circular security of the Paillier encryption scheme [40].
Additionally, we describe a verification technique to directly check correctness of the actual
computation, rather than the absence of a potential error as in [9]. This results in fewer
repetitions of the overall computation for a given error bound.
3.1.1 Background and Motivation
Secure MPC has been a vital research area in Cryptography for the last 30 years. Since the
early seminal works [49; 50; 27; 4; 13], we know that it is possible for two or more parties to
compute a joint function of individual secret inputs. It is a very powerful tool, since most,
if not all of the security problems can be solved in principle using a multiparty computation
protocol. Those initial results established the feasibility of the solutions, and at the same
22
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time highlighted their complexity. The research of the last 30 years has been focused on
inventing increasingly powerful MPC techniques to get more efficient solutions. One of the
bottleneck parameters that immediately attracted researchers’ attention was communication
complexity: all the early results require communication between the parties which is at least
as large as the size of the circuit representing the function being computed. Ideally one
would like the parties to exchange just a few messages of limited size.
Most of the research on this issue focused on types of homomorphic encryption (resp.
secret sharing) schemes, which allow the computation of a function to be carried out non-
interactively directly on the encryption (resp. shares) of the secret inputs. For example
additively homomorphic encryption [28; 16; 37; 39; 40; 18] allows the parties to publish
encryptions of their inputs, and to compute any linear function without interaction except
for a final decryption step. Similarly this can be achieved by using linear secret sharing
such as Shamir’s [43]. These techniques were applied to the concept of Private Information
Retrieval (PIR) [15; 14; 34] which allows the secure computation of a “selection” function,
Party 1 holds n values x1, . . . , xn and Party 2 holds an index i, the output is xi, with
communication which is sublinear in the size of the circuit.
General solutions for any function had to wait for the discovery by Gentry of FHE [24]
which enables the computation of arbitrary functions over encrypted input, breaking the
circuit barrier in general. The drawback of FHE is that in spite of continuous progress, even
the best implementations of FHE remain quite slow [25; 26; 38]. Additionally, the set of
cryptographic assumptions underlying FHE remains limited to assumptions related to the
complexity of lattice based problems, and do not include more classical assumptions such as
factoring or discrete logarithm.
These observations motivated Boyle et al. to look for alternatives. In a very exciting
recent result [9] they present a Homomorphic Secret Sharing scheme which allows the non-
interactive computation of Branching Programs over the shares of the secret inputs. Further
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optimizations as well as transporting some results to the generic group model for DDH-hard
groups are given by the same authors in [11]. Their scheme is orders of magnitude more
efficient than FHE and its security is based on the DDH Assumption.
3.1.2 Our Results
We extend the results in [9; 11] by showing that Homomorphic Secret Sharing for Branching
Programs can be based on the circular security of the Paillier [40] encryption schemes.
While our protocols follow the same blueprint of the Homomorphic Secret Sharing in [9] our
extensions were not immediate. Below we give an overview of the main technical problems
and challenges we encountered, and the techniques used to overcome them.
3.1.3 Techniques
To begin, we give a very high-level review of the techniques used in [9]. We then outline
where new techniques are needed for our work. Informally, the construction of [9] follows
these steps:
1. The scheme uses the ElGamal encryption scheme modified to be additively homomor-
phic by placing the plaintext in the exponent. That is, encryptions of a message x
look like JxK = (α = gr, β = hr · gx) , where h = gc is the public key. When messages
are small, decryption is feasible by performing a discrete logarithm after the usual
ElGamal decryption.
2. The scheme also uses, simple 2-out-of-2 additive sharing. Given z ∈ Zq where q is the
order of the ElGamal group, we denote 〈z〉 = (z1, z2) such that z1 + z2 = z mod q,
where each party Pi holds zi.
3. Given JxK = (α, β), 〈y〉 = (y1, y2) and 〈cy〉 = (w1, w2) each party Pi can now locally
compute a share γi as γi = β
yi ·α−wi , such that γ1 ·γ2 = gxy, i.e. a multiplicative sharing
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of gxy. Note how this step effectively removes the randomness from the encryption of
x, using the secret key c.
4. Finally, a clever technique is used to compute a distributed discrete logarithm, thus
recovering an additive sharing of xy without the need for interaction. We point out
that their procedure requires the multiplicative sharing to be in a cyclic group.
Abstracting out from the specifics, we can see that the scheme in [9] requires the following
ingredients:
• An encryption scheme which is both message and key homomorphic over Z (or a finite
quotient), i.e., a scheme that allows the transformation in step 3 above.
• A non-interactive method for transforming a multiplicative sharing of gz into an ad-
ditive sharing of z, where these two values “live” in the ciphertext and message space
(respectively) of the encryption scheme.
Our Construction. Let’s first go over the high level idea of our protocol. Pretend that
gx is an encryption of x in a finite group G with the generator g. The goal is to compute the
multiplication of a memory value y by an input value x. So we want to compute z = x · y.
If each party have the encryption of x and an additive shares of y, then they can compute a
multiplicative shares of gz as shown in table 3.1.
P0 P1
gx gx
r y − r
gz0 = (gx)r gz1 = (gx)y−r
Table 3.1: Multiplicative Share of gx·y.
We need to convert the multiplicative shares to additive shares in order to be able to
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do another multiplication. The idea for the conversion is as follows: Having multiplicative
shares of z means that one party holds gz0 and another party holds g−z1 with z steps gap
if we think of each step as a multiplication by the generator g. We will consider a subset
S of the group consists of random points with density δ showed by red dots in figure 3.1.
For example, S can be defined as the group elements that a suitable PRF φ outputs zero;
S := {h ∈ G : φ(h) = 0}.
Figure 3.1: Share Conversion
The conversion on input gi outputs the distance of the input gi to S and outputs zero if
after certain number of steps we do not hit S. We will have three case as follows:
1. Point /∈ zone 1, point ∈ zone 2.
2. Point ∈ zone 1.
3. Point /∈ zone1 ∪ zone2.
We show the output of the conversion procedure on Pi’s input with disti (for i = 0, 1 ). Only
case 1 works in our favour and in this case dist0 − dist1 = z meaning that we have additive
shares of z. The error for case 2 and 3 is roughly δz. So, if we want to reduce the error for
any value, we just make the density less and as a trade-off we need to take more steps.
We now address the challenge of adapting these techniques to make use of the Paillier
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cryptosystem. Recall that Paillier is naturally additively homomorphic over the integers,
which works in our favor here. Additionally, we can use a version of Paillier threshold
decryption [17; 32] to obtain the “key homomorphic” property which allows to perform
Step 3.
Recall that a Paillier encryption of an integer x is of the form gxrn mod n2, where n is
an RSA modulus, ord(g) = n, and ord(rn) | ϕ(n). Since it is required that (n, ϕ(n)) = 1, we






Now if σ = gxrn is an encryption of x, then by raising to the λ power we get: σλ =
(gxrn)λ = gx mod n2. While there are efficient procedures for completing the decryption
(recovering x from gx), note that we have already made substantial progress in obtaining
the necessary ingredients for the [9] blueprint. Given an additive sharing 〈λy〉 = (z1, z2) of
λy (so that z1 + z2 = λy), then (σ
z1 , σz2) is a multiplicative sharing of gxy, i.e.
σz1σz2 = σλy = gxy mod n2.
If xy is relatively small, we might hope to then perform the distributed discrete log protocol
from [9], however there are a few complications. To begin, it is not entirely obvious that
the distributed discrete log protocol would work in Z×n2 which is not a cyclic group. For
example, while certainly gxy lives in 〈g〉, each party’s shares do not – the shares sit in Z×n2 ,
and furthermore in different cosets of 〈g〉. Fortunately, we can modify the protocol in [9] (as
well as most of the variants from [11], sans a few optimizations) to work for any finite group
in a fairly straightforward way (see Section 3.2 for details).
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The other main issue concerns the representation of our additive shares. In the original
ElGamal-based scheme, additive shares of a value y satisfy
∑
yi ≡ y mod q, where q is the
order of the group. Note that q is public in this case. Thus, each party can perform addition
modulo q without knowledge of any secret values. In Paillier, however, we need to work
with additive shares of values that work modulo nϕ(n), a value that must be kept secret.
Therefore we do this sharing over the integers. Without a careful implementation this step
can cause the size of the shares to grow exponentially, but we are able to avoid this problem.
Details can be found in Section 3.3.
Verifying Computations. In [9; 11], the authors describe “Las Vegas” style techniques
to check for the potential risk of having incurred an incorrect computation during each step
of the protocol. If the possibility of an error is never signaled, then the overall computation
is considered correct. This method was then shown to provide efficiency improvements for
several applications.
In this work, we describe a technique to directly check correctness which verifies the ac-
tual computation, rather than the absence of a potentially “risky” situation. This method
of checking does not produce false negatives (erroneously reporting that the protocol failed),
and allows us to reduce even further the number of required invocations for a desired overall
error bound by a constant fraction. The price we pay for this (in addition to a negligi-
ble probability of a false positive), is some extra effort to compute the values used in the
check. However, this effort depends linearly on the program size, whilst each repetition takes
quadratic time in the program size. Hence, we achieve a savings in computation for large
programs. Our verification method works both for the original ElGamal-based construction
of [9] and for our Paillier-based construction, although the benefits are more pronounced for
the latter. Details can be found in Section 3.4.
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3.2 Share Conversion
Here we provide our first technical contribution: A generalization of the distributed discrete
log and share conversion procedures from [9] which works in any finite group G, not just a
cyclic group.
Consider the setting of two party computation, where one party holds x and the other
party holds y such that xy = gb where g is an element of a group G (i.e. (x, y) is a
multiplicative sharing relative to g of a small value b. Suppose that both parties have access
to a random function φ : G −→ {0, . . . , k − 1} for k ∈ N (appropriate values for k will be
determined shortly).
We will prove that if each party locally runs the procedure DDLog below (where the
input a is set to the share held by each party and δ,M are parameters we will determine
later) then at the end, the parties output values i, j such that i− j = b with sufficiently high
probability. In other words the procedure simultaneously computes the discrete log1 of gb
and turns the multiplicative sharing into an additive one.
Algorithm 1 DDLogG,g(a, δ,M, φ)
1: i = 0;h = a;T = 2M ln(2/δ)/δ
2: while φ(h) 6= 0 and i < T do
3: h = gh
4: i = i+ 1
5: end while
6: return i
Let G be a finite group, and g ∈ G. Note that if two elements x, y ∈ G have a product in
〈g〉, this is of course equivalent to saying that x and the inverse of y live in the same coset
of 〈g〉, or put another way, x and y−1 differ by some number of “g-steps”:
x = gby−1. (3.1)
1There is no contradiction here with the hardness of discrete log, since this works only for small values
of b.








Figure 3.2: Illustration of DDLog procedure on xy = gb. Here, x, y are multiplicative shares
of a small value b, which are inputs to DDLog. Both x and y−1 sit in the same coset 〈g〉x
of 〈g〉. The dots represent the elements of a random δ-sparse subset S in 〈g〉x. Note that
(with good probability) the difference in the number of steps taken is b = sy−1 − sx, so that
(−sx, sy−1) is an additive sharing of b.
Define S = φ−1({0}). Then the parties will be able to “synchronize” by counting g-steps
to the next value in S, recovering an additive sharing of b. The parameter k can be used
to balance the running time of the process with its success probability. The basic idea is
depicted in Figure 3.2. Note that the domain of φ must be the entire group G not just the
particular coset where x, y−1 reside. Indeed, finding a useful representation of that coset (in
order to instantiate φ) might be difficult.2
Fortunately this is not much of a complication – equation (3.1) combined with the fact
that φ gives random labels to each element allows the same analysis to proceed for the restric-
tion of φ to any coset. Indeed, Algorithm 1 is a proper generalization of the corresponding
algorithm from [9] (where the group is cyclic 〈g〉 = G so there is only one coset), and a very
similar argument suffices to show its correctness in our application. We provide a few details
for completeness. Following the notation of [9], we set M to be an upper bound on the value
2For example in our DCRA-based construction, this would be equivalent to decryption.
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being shared and T will be a “timeout” value.
Proposition 3.2.1 ([9, Prop. 3.2]). Let G be any finite group, g ∈ G, δ > 0, and M ∈ N.




DDLog(y−1, δ,M, φ)− DDLog(x, δ,M, φ) = b
]
≥ 1− δ
where φ is sampled uniformly from all functions from G −→ {0, . . . , b2M/δc}.
Proof sketch: Modeling φ as a random function from G −→ {0, . . . , b2M/δc}, note
that for any a ∈ G we have Pr
φ
$←R
[φ(a) = 0] ≈ δ
2M
, and in particular the same is true of φ
restricted to the coset 〈g〉x. With this in hand, the rest of the proof proceeds as that of [9,
Prop. 3.2], using a few straightforward applications of the well known inequality 1 +x ≤ ex.
Lastly, we remark that when the random function φ is replaced by a pseudorandom function
(PRF), an analogous proposition holds, stating that no efficient adversary can find a sequence
of instructions that would cause the probability to deviate substantially below 1 − δ. The
important observation (present in [9]) is that by modularizing DDLog (in particular, this
procedure accesses φ as an oracle, and does not need to know the seed), we can use any
adversary that finds an input which is “bad” for a PRF φ to construct an adversary that
distinguishes φ from random, thus breaking the security guarantee of the PRF.
3.3 Construction from DCRA
Using DDLog introduced in previous section as one of our sub-procedures, we will present
an HSS scheme based on the circular security of Paillier’s encryption which evaluates RMS
programs (see section 2.3). We make use of the following convenient notation, borrowed
from [9]:
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1. For input x ∈ Zn, JxKλ is a Paillier encryption of x with respect to the secret key λ.
That is, JxK := E(x) = σ = (1 + n)x · rn mod n2 where r $← Z×n , and λ is the unique
integer in [0, . . . , nϕ(n) − 1] satisfying equation (2.1). Note that σλ = (1 + n)x ∈ Z×n2
in this case.
2. 〈y〉 refers to additive secret shares of y, i.e., two values y0, y1 such that y = y0 +y1 over
the integers.
3. Lastly, 〈〈y〉〉 refers to multiplicative secret shares of (1+n)y i.e., two values h0, h1 ∈ Zn2
such that h0 · h1 = (1 + n)y mod n2. These are intermediate values that arise during
multiplication instructions, and will be converted back to 〈y〉 by the sub-routine DDLog.
Note that JxKλ is a global value meaning that both parties receive the same value, in contrast
to 〈y〉 and 〈〈y〉〉, where each party has a different share. In the following we denote with λ(i)














, 〈x〉, 〈λx〉. Note that this will typically include encryptions of many
bits of λ which is why we need the circular security assumption for Paillier.
Values y in memory locations will instead be stored as 〈y〉, 〈λy〉. The original shares of
all additive sharing are chosen randomly in [−n3, n3] which result in a distribution that is
statistically close to uniform for any shared value.
We first notice that additions are easily computed due to the homomorphic properties of
Paillier’s encryption and the additive secret sharing. One thing to note is that the size of
the additive sharing increases by at most one bit after each addition since each player locally
adds shares over the integers. This is not a major problem (since the size of the shares will
still be polynomial by the end of the execution of the program). Furthermore, upon each
multiplication step we will again have small additive shares for the product, as these shares
are produced by DDLog (which outputs shares of logarithmic size in its polynomial running
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time). We discuss this further in what follows.
We now turn our attention to the computation of multiplication between an input x and
a memory location value y. Since this value will be stored in a memory location (and so that
it may be used again in subsequent multiplications) we need to compute 〈xy〉 and 〈λxy〉.
The computation of 〈xy〉 uses JxKλ and 〈λy〉 via the following steps3
(JxKλ , 〈λy〉)
(a)- 〈〈xy〉〉 (b)- 〈xy〉. (3.2)
A description of steps (a) and (b) follows:
(a) Let z1 + z2 = λy and σ = JxKλ. Then each player computes γi = σ
zi mod n2. Note that
γ1 · γ2 = σλy = (1 + n)xy mod n2. In other words (γ1, γ2) = 〈〈xy〉〉. We denote with
(γ1, γ2) = MultShares(JxKλ , 〈λy〉).
(b) Use the DDLog procedure on (γ1, γ2) with parameters δ,M (which will be specified by
the RMS program being run on the shares) and random function φ. We denote with
ConvertShares(〈〈xy〉〉, δ,M, φ) the pair
〈xy〉 = (−DDLog(γ1, δ,M, φ),DDLog(γ−12 , δ,M, φ)).
Note that the first party negates the result of DDLog to maintain the invariant that
the shares add to the shared value (DDLog output shares whose difference is the shared
value), and that the second party must invert her share before invoking DDLog (see
Figure 3.2).

























3Differently than in [9] we do not use 〈y〉 in the multiplication step – The additive sharing of y however
needs to be stored so that we can compute the output at the end.
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A description of steps (c) and (d) follows:
(c) ` invocations of step (a,b) above to compute each 〈xyλ(i)〉
(d) Each party will locally multiply the i-th share by the value 2i and sum these shares
together.
Note that if the shares in 〈λy〉 are of size t at the beginning of this step, at the end they are
of size at most 3t (2t+ ` to be precise4). However these shares do not grow further since at
the next step they are used “in the exponent”, and the result of additive shares coming out
of the DDLog procedure is always `.
The following figures will present our homomorphic secret sharing scheme (Share,Eval).
4` ≤ t since additive shares start of size ` and then they can grow as the result of addition operations.
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Homomorohic Secret Sharing Scheme-Share(1k, x1, . . . , xn).
The inputs are security parameter 1k and bits xi for i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
• Sample k-bit prime numbers p, q, set n = pq and ϕ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
• Compute λ ∈ Zn·ϕ(n) according to Equation 2.1. Let ` = log(n2) .
• Sample a PRF φ : Z×n2 −→ {0, . . . , b2M/δc}.
• For each input xi sample the following;







, ∀t ∈ [l] := {0, ..., l − 1}:
A Paillier encryption of the integer λ(t)xi with public key n
2.
– 〈xi〉 ← AdditiveShare(xi).
– 〈λxi〉 ← AdditiveShare(λxi) .
• Party b receives






Notation: The AdditiveShare operator on input x selects α ∈ [−n3, n3] uniformly at
random and computes β = x− α over the integers. It sets 〈x〉 = (α, β).
Figure 3.3: Share for secret sharing an input x via the HSS scheme
Theorem 3.3.1. Assuming that Paillier is circular secure, the scheme (Share,Eval) as de-
scribed in figures 3.3and 3.4 is a secure homomorphic secret sharing with error δ for the class
of RMS programs.
The proof follows the same structure of the proof in [9] and we refer the reader to that
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proof. The only difference is that our additive sharings are statistically secure rather than
perfectly secure as in [9]. This comes into play only in the proof of Lemma 3.11 in [9],
specifically in the proof of the indistinguishability of Hybrid 0 versus Hybrid 1. In our
simulation the shares of each player in Hybrid 1 are chosen uniformly at random in [−n3, n3].
For player P1 this distribution is identical to the distribution in the real protocol (Hybrid
0). For player P2 that’s not the case, indeed the distribution of the shares of this player in
the real protocol is uniform in [−n3 + x, n3 + x] where x is the value being shared. It’s not
hard to see that the statistical distance between the two distributions is 2x
2n3
which is O( 1
n
)
i.e. negligible in the worst case when x = λ = O(n2).
From Private to Public-key. In the construction above, secret shares of an input x





}t∈[l] and additive secret shares 〈x〉, 〈λx〉. It
is not immediately clear how one would generate those values without knowing the secret λ.
However, by leveraging the homomorphic property of Paillier, we can generate these values
for a secret sharing of x given only public key information which is independent of the input
x. We can set up an initiative algorithm that samples a Paillier key pair (n, λ), encryptions
of {JλiKλ}t∈[l], and evaluation key corresponding to additive secret shares of 〈λ〉. A user
without any knowledge of the secret key can then compute JxKλ and {JλixKλ}t∈[l] using the
public parameters and homomorphic property of the underlying encryption scheme. Values
〈x〉 and 〈λx〉 can be computed by running Eval.
Optimizing the generator. For protocols based on DDH, considerable practical perfor-
mance improvements have been demonstrated in [11]. For example, by using the quadratic
reciprocity theorem to choose pseudo-Mersenne primes p for which large prime order sub-
groups of Z×p are generated by the integer 2, impressive speed-ups for DDLog are shown.
Unfortunately, these techniques do not seem to transfer well to Paillier, as the analogous
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subgroups (for which 2 is a generator) would naturally be contained in the subgroup of n-th
powers, rather than 〈1 + n〉. While it might be the case that rejection sampling safe primes
until 〈2〉 = 〈1 + n〉 is plausible,5 and moreover such that the modulus n is close to a power
of 2, it is not clear how this would affect security. However, we note that the “standard”
generator (1 + n) of the subgroup of order n actually admits a small optimization, which is
as follows. Let h denote the share of one of the parties, which will be input into DDLog.
First, write h = an + b, where a, b < n. Then notice that h(1 + n) ≡ (a + b)n + b mod n2.
Also, note that since the two inputs to corresponding DDLog invocations will be in the same
coset of 〈1 + n〉, the values b will also be identical for each share. So not only can we define
the PRF φ to have domain Zn, more importantly we can substitute a multiplication (by
(1 + n) mod n2) with a simple addition of two values in Zn (we only need to keep track of
(a+b) mod n for each step). Since performing the group multiplications was the most costly
part of DDLog, this may yield considerable savings in computation.
5At least the test is efficient if the factorization of the order of the group is known, as is the case if n
was a product of safe primes.
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Homomorphic Share Evaluation of RMS Programs-EvalG,g(b, Shareb, P, δ)
Each party Pb runs on its secret share value Shareb, the RMS program P of size ≤ S with magnitude bound 1M , error bound
δ. Set δ′ := δ/((l + 1)MS).
• Load inputs into memory:
– 〈yj〉 ← 〈xi〉.
– 〈λyj〉 ← 〈λxi〉.
In which 〈xi〉 and 〈λxi〉 are as in Share.
• Addition over memory values:
– Compute 〈yk〉 ← 〈yi〉+ 〈yj〉.
– Compute 〈λyk〉 ← 〈λyi〉+ 〈λyj〉.
Each party locally adds its shares over the integers.
• Multiplication of an input xi and a memory value yj :






, 〈λyj〉) and output 〈〈λ(t)xiyj〉〉.
∗ Run ConvertShares(〈〈λ(t)xiyj〉〉, δ′,M, φ) and output 〈λ(t)xiyj〉.
∗ Set 〈λ(t)yk〉 ← 〈λ(t)xiyj〉.




– Run MultShares(JxiKλ , 〈λyj〉) and output 〈〈xiyj〉〉.
– Execute ConvertShares(〈〈xiyj〉〉, δ′,M, φ) and output 〈xiyj〉.
– Set a new memory location k to value yk = xiyj by storing
∗ Set 〈λyk〉 ← 〈λxiyj〉.
∗ Set 〈yk〉 ← 〈xiyj〉.
• Output memory values:
– If b = 0, set 〈z〉 ← 〈yi〉 otherwise let 〈z〉 be the additive inverse i.e., 〈z〉 ← −〈yi〉.
– Call the PRF φ on (1 + n) and shift the additive secret by its output meaning:
〈z〉 ← 〈z〉+ φ(1 + n).
– 〈Oj〉 ← 〈z〉.
– Output 〈Oj〉.
Figure 3.4: Procedures for performing homomorphic operations on secret shares
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3.4 Verifying Computations
The work of [9] mentions a “Las Vegas” style version of HSS in which one of the parties
checks for the potential of the ConvertShares / DDLog procedure failing at each step. If there
was never a chance of failure, then a special flag is set by this party to indicate that the
results of the computation are guaranteed to be correct. This method was then shown to
provide efficiency improvements for several applications. In particular, for function secret
sharing applications (denoted “FSS” henceforth; see [8; 10]) in which neither evaluator
learns the output (e.g., PIR), this method can be used to reduce the number of parallel
invocations required to attain a desired bound on the error probability of the protocol. In this
section, we briefly describe a technique to directly check correctness which verifies the actual
computation, rather than the absence of a potentially “risky” situation arising during DDLog.
Since this method of checking does not produce false negatives (erroneously reporting that
the protocol failed), we can reduce even further the number of required invocations for a
desired overall error bound by a constant fraction. The price we pay for this (in addition to
a negligible probability of a false positive), is some extra effort to compute the values used in
the check. However, this effort depends linearly on the program size, whilst each repetition
takes quadratic time in the program size. Hence, we achieve a savings in computation for
large programs. We suspect this technique will be most useful in the case of Paillier-based
constructions where some of the optimizations of [11] which reduce computation are not
readily available. We nevertheless describe the method for both cases, as the ElGamal-based
version has a simpler description.
The method works by constructing a sort of “hash” of the intermediate states of the
computation in two ways – the states prescribed by multiplicative shares, and the states
given by the additive shares after performing DDLog. We first consider the original case of
ElGamal-encrypted inputs. Let G be a group of prime order q, and let 〈g〉 = G. Let m
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i the exponents of the multiplicative sharing of the i-th multiplication step. That




i . After running DDLog, the players will hold z0i , z
1
i , respectively.
If the DDLog protocol was successful, it should be the case that zi = zi for i = 0, . . . ,m− 1,


























. Now consider the
polynomial (P − P ) ∈ Fq[X]. If DDLog succeeded at each multiplication step, then this
polynomial is identically 0. On the other hand, if at any point DDLog failed, this polynomial
will be non-zero, and of course will have degree at most m − 1. Since q is prime, (P − P )










Thus, with high probability, [(P − P )(α) = 0] ⇐⇒ [no errors occurred in DDLog]. For
applications like PIR, this observation alone will suffice: we can modify the protocol to
send a random α along with the query, and the servers will compute their shares of (Pj −
P j)(α), which will be returned with the answers to the query. Note that the shares of P (α)
must be computed in the exponent (which can nevertheless be done using Horner’s rule),
and the shares of P (α) are computed directly in Zq. Hence the total additional cost is m
exponentiations and m multiplications. We also mention a few optimizations. First, since
each exponentiation will be to the same exponent α, we can pre-compute an addition chain
for α and reuse this for all the exponentiations. Second, we note that it is not necessary
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to choose α
$← Zq. We could for example choose α $← {1, . . . , (m− 1)280} instead and still
achieve the same effect as equation (3.5), meanwhile reducing the number of multiplications
for exponentiations by a factor of two to four (for common choices of G, as of this writing).
From Paillier Encryption. We can also adapt the above to work with Paillier. In this
case, (1 + n) will serve as our generator g, but since we now work in the larger, composite
order group Z×n2 (rather than 〈g〉), a few remarks are in order. First note that if n = pq
is an RSA modulus, then for f ∈ Zn[X] with deg(f) = d, f has at most d2 roots. This
follows at once from the Chinese Remainder Theorem: the roots α ∈ Zn of f are in bijective
correspondence with the respective pairs of roots (αp, αq) of fp = (f mod p) ∈ Zp[X] and
fq = (f mod q) ∈ Zq[X]. Since deg(fp), deg(fq) ≤ d and since Zp,Zq are fields, it follows
that there can be at most d2 roots of f in Zn, and thus the main point of (3.5) still holds
(that is, Pr
[
(P − P )(α) = 0
]
= negl).
We also remark on the importance of using Horner’s rule in computing (1 + n)Pj(α).
Before, we were working in a cyclic group, and so the multiplicative shares were of the form
gPj(α) for j ∈ {0, 1}. In this case, each player has a sequence of group elements γ0i , γ1i such
that γ0i γ
1
i = (1 + n)












= (1 + n)P (α)
but at first glance, it seems that it might be somewhat expensive to raise the shares γji
to the (large) exponents αi: since the order of the group (nϕ(n)) is not public, it might
seem that this would take work proportional to the length of αi, which is proportional
to the multiplicative depth of the program. Fortunately using Horner’s rule prevents us
from having to compute or store αi directly, and instead we can simply exponentiate by α
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repeatedly.6 Lastly, since current values of n may be 2048 bits in length, choosing α
$←
{1, . . . , (m− 1)2 · 280} will provide substantial savings. At this point, the protocol follows
identically to the above version for ElGamal.
Applications. Applications of the above Las Vegas versions of ConvertShares include sit-
uations where it is unimportant to keep the intermediate states of the computation hidden
from the receiver of the output. For example (as noted by [9]), using the scheme as an FSS
to perform two-server PIR protocols. The benefit of this approach is that, for a target overall
error bound, it further reduces the number of parallel repetitions of the protocol that must
be performed to achieve it. Under the (generally wrong) assumption that the intermediate
values of the computation are uniform in their domain, it is not hard to show that the prob-
ability of failure for a single round decreases by a factor of ≈ 1/2. However, as noted this
assumption is generally not true. What can be said, is that the smaller the intermediate
values are (relative to their domain), the more of an advantage this method provides. For
concreteness, an example: assuming half of the intermediate values are 0 and half are 1 (as
would hold in expectation for the random case), then if the target error bound was 2−80 and
the error for a single invocation of the original protocol was set to be 1/4, then our protocol
(assuming random intermediate values) would reduce this failure rate to 1/8 and thus the
required number of invocations would decrease from 40 to 27. Again, we note that while the
computation cost increases, this increase is linear in the multiplicative depth of the program
(and polynomial in a security parameter) which provides an advantage for large programs,
especially for Paillier-based constructions where many of the speed-ups for DDLog from [11]
do not seem available.
6We note that naive polynomial evaluation could also be made reasonable by raising to αi mod n, since
in any abelian group, if
∏






k mod n =∏
(hk mod ni ).
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3.5 Conclusions and Future Work
We extend recent breakthrough results by Boyle et al. [9; 11], which under the DDH As-
sumption, present homomorphic secret sharing and secure function evaluation protocols for
branching programs with low communication complexity. We show how to construct similar
protocols based on the circular security of the Paillier encryption scheme. In the process, we
extended their “distributed discrete log” procedures to work over any finite group, and in
particular when the discrete log is being sought in a subgroup of unknown order. This tech-
nical contribution could be of independent interest and may lead to techniques for proving
the security of such protocols under larger classes of computational assumptions.
Our result leaves several interesting open problems:
1. Our non-interactive scheme supports a 2-party setting. Can similar results be obtained
for more than 2 parties?
2. Analyze the circular security assumption on the Paillier encryption scheme and/or
come up with alternative schemes with the same functionality that can be proven to
be circular secure. This seems a non-trivial question, and as shown by [42], there
is no chance for proving a “blanket” result for bit encryption, as there is no black-
box reduction of circular security to semantic security. Indeed, there have been many
results in the recent literature showing separations between the two notions under
various assumptions [1; 12; 6; 35; 2; 33; 30; 48].
3. Construct Homomorphic Secret Sharing based on other assumptions. One interesting
question here is if one can bootstrap from branching programs to general circuits
without relying on FHE? This will extend the class of functions for which we can
break the “circuit barrier” for communication complexity in secure MPC.
4. Explore further optimizations to the Paillier-based protocol. In particular, the work
of [11] makes use of PKI for the setup phase, in place of performing general purpose
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MPC. Their technique seems to leverage heavily a sort of symmetry that is present
in ElGamal, which is not shared by the Paillier encryption scheme: in particular,
they make use of the fact that many different secret keys can exist for a single set
of common parameters (the group G and generator g). With Paillier, the modulus n
uniquely determines secret information, so it would seem new ideas are required.
5. Empirical data regarding implementations may also be of interest to have a better
idea of at what point various trade-offs make sense (for example, making use of the
verification process from Section 3.4 to reduce the number of repetitions vs trying to
squash the degree using randomizing polynomials [31; 3]).
Chapter 4
Publicaly Evaluatble Peceptual Hash
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Background and Motivation
Many social media platforms have policies against uploading explicit images of anyone with-
out their consent and will take down such images upon an affected user’s request. However,
substantial harm may have already occurred by the time a victim finds out that such an
image is online. Ideally, these platforms would prevent such images from being uploaded
from the beginning, and indeed, efforts in this direction are already underway. This task,
however, is a technically challenging one: images and other types of multimedia files, can be
processed and manipulated so that while their semantic meaning remains the same (percep-
tually the images are still the same), their digital representations in bits are entirely different.
Therefore, it is challenging to build a blacklist of images using traditional forms of hashing
(such as cryptographic collision-resistant hashing) as perceptually similar images will almost
certainly produce a completely different hash.
To address the problems outlined above, the concept of perceptual hashing has been de-
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veloped (see e.g., [47; 45]). Perceptual hashing (PH) produces a fingerprint of an image with
the property that “similar” images (i.e., perceived as similar by human vision) will produce
“similar” fingerprints (i.e., bit-strings which are close under some metric). A sufficiently
robust PH will detect if two different files represent perceptually the same image, even in
the presence of a malicious user who is attempting to modify the original image in a way to
remain perceptually similar, while producing a substantially different PH value.
As one might imagine given the multitude of ways available to modify an image without
substantially affecting what the image depicts, it is a difficult task to design a robust PH
algorithm, and such algorithms are often carefully guarded to prevent analysis by malicious
parties. Not only is the source code for such algorithms kept secret, but also the input/output
behavior is not made available to the public. For example, Microsoft’s PhotoDNA [36]
algorithm is only available as an online service, and furthermore, only specific organizations
they deem qualified may access it.
The secrecy of the PH algorithm is not only worrisome from a security point of view
(as security by obscurity is never a good design principle) but also raises a very important
privacy concern. If users are aware that an explicit image of theirs is in another’s possession
and want to prevent such an image from being posted, they have to provide the image to
the social media platform, so that a PH can be evaluated on it and added to the blacklist.
This is, of course, problematic for users who are reluctant (if not outright unwilling) to share
such images.
The Facebook Pilot Program. In 2017 Facebook developed a pilot program in Aus-
tralia to combat the diffusion of so-called Non-Consensual Intimate Images (NCII) (also
inappropriately termed revenge porn in the press). In this pilot program, Facebook asked
users to voluntarily submit intimate images that they were afraid could be posted on the
site by former sexual partners. Facebook would compute a perceptual hash (specifically
PhotoDNA) on the image, and add the resulting fingerprint to a blacklist database.
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Facebook made it very clear that the NCIIs submitted by users would be used exclusively
to compute a PH on them and then would be immediately removed from their servers. The
blacklist database would then be used to block future posting of that image, no matter how
manipulated, compressed, cropped, etc.
The program was broadly covered even by the popular press (see e.g., [44]). In spite of
Facebook’s extensive guarantees, the coverage was not always in positive terms. Much of the
criticism focused on the need by users to trust Facebook with their intimate images. Given
Facebook’s overall (and often dubious) track record on privacy, the criticism could be seen
as well-founded. Apart from intentional misuse of the data (e.g., Facebook using the images
for other purposes like training algorithms), even a benign bug in the code could expose data
that users had entrusted to the platform specifically to protect it from exposure (see [7] for a
very cogent discussion on what could possibly go wrong with this approach).
The question raised from many corners was, “why must the users send the NCII to
Facebook, instead of just computing and submitting the hashes themselves?” The answer
lies precisely on the need to keep the PH algorithm secret.
The Research Question. The Facebook pilot program exposed one of the main weak-
nesses of known PH algorithms: in order to be robust, they have to be secret. An adversary,
given a particular image and knowledge of how the algorithm operates, can devise a modified
image which looks perceptually similar to the original one and yet maps to a sufficiently far
fingerprint. The natural question we therefore asked is whether or not it is possible to have
robust and publicly evaluatable perceptual hash functions. Such functions would allow users
to register sensitive images into the blacklist without revealing the actual image, but rather
just a non-sensitive fingerprint of it.
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4.1.2 Our Contribution
We answer the above question in the affirmative for the case of PH functions that are keyed
with a secret key, i.e., PH functions for which the algorithm is public, but it requires the use of
a secret random key to achieve robustness. For such PH functions, it is possible to construct
a cryptographic public key version of it that can be evaluated by the user. We show that
such public key constructions can be achieved with only modest computational overhead,
as exemplified by our extensive implementation test of one such candidate function. More
specifically, our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We introduce formal definitions for perceptual hashing for both the secret and public
key versions. As far as we know, this is the first formalization of the concept, and
it lays the theoretical foundations on which we analyze the security of our proposed
scheme.
• We then present a theoretical result showing that any secret-key PH algorithm can
be transformed into a public key one via the use of Fully Homomorphic Encryption
(FHE) [23]. While the intuition is fairly simple, the full details of the proof of security
reveal several interesting technical complications which we resolve via the use of Zero-
Knowledge Proofs [29].
• We show that for a specific candidate PH function [45], the full power of FHE is
not needed and we can instead use any additively homomorphic encryption such as
Paillier’s [41]. For this particular scheme, we present an optimized (using vectorization)
implementation that shows the computational overhead of adding encryption to PH is
minimal, resulting in an efficient scheme.
Overview of our results. We first present game-based definitions of security for a PH
algorithm. The idea is to formally define what the algorithms are (key generation, hash
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computation, and hash detection) and then parametrize security according to a similarity
function that determines if two images are perceptually similar or not. We then define the
capabilities of the adversary – we allow the adversary to make:
• Registration Queries where the adversary submits images to the database at will (in
the secret key case by submitting the actual image, and in the public key case by
computing and sending the tag)
• Detection Queries where the adversary submits images to see if the server detects them
as similar to any of the images registered earlier.
The adversary succeeds if it finds two pictures which are perceptually similar (according to
the parametrized similarity function) and yet are not detected as such by the PH algorithm.
Details appear in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
With formal definitions for security in place, we start from the assumption that secure
secret-key PH functions exist (e.g., PhotoDNA, or other schemes in the literature which
specifically fit the public algorithm/secret key framework [19; 45; 47]). The basic intuition
to construct a public-key version is fairly simple: the server (e.g., the owner of the secret
key) publishes an encryption of the secret key under an FHE key. This allows any user to
evaluate an encrypted form of the PH fingerprint over a private image and send that to the
server. The server then decrypts it and stores. Later, when an image is submitted to the
server, the latter can compute the PH and use it for detection.
This basic idea, however, is not sufficient by itself to formally prove security. If we want
to prove that the public key version of PH we construct is as secure as the private key one
we started with, we need to show a reduction from an adversary breaking the public key
version to one breaking the secret key one. However, a technical problem arises when the
adversary makes Detection Queries as it is not immediately clear how we can answer those
in the reduction (since we do not know the secret key we are trying to break). We solved this
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problem by adding a Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge of the image submitted during a
Registration Query which allows the reduction to build a blacklist database on the secret key
server, and to correctly answer Detection Queries, without knowledge of the actual secret
key. Details appear in Section 4.2.3.
The above approach works for any PH algorithm, though it is admittedly not feasible
in practice due to the high computational cost of implementing FHE. Our next step was
to look at concrete PH candidates to see if we can gain better efficiency. We restricted
our attention to non-proprietary algorithms which have been published in academic venues
and we specifically focused on [45]. For this function, we realized that it is possible to use
additively homomorphic encryption such as Paillier’s [41], and we show that the result is
highly feasible through a complete implementation of a publicly evaluatable version of the
scheme in [45]. Details appear in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
4.2 Perceptual Hashing
4.2.1 Private-key Perceptual Hash Definition
Let us recall the typical application scenario for perceptual hashing. The idea is to develop
a system where a social media platform (e.g., Facebook) can prevent inappropriate images
from being posted. The system is divided in three phases:
• Setup: The platform chooses a secret key for a PH function, and initializes an empty
database of forbidden images (the blacklist);
• Image Registration: Users submit images that they do not want posted online. The plat-
form computes a fingerprint on those images via the PH and stores it in the database.
• Image Submission: Users submit images for posting. The platform computes their
fingerprint via the PH and blocks them if the fingerprint matches any of the ones
CHAPTER 4. PUBLICALY EVALUATBLE PECEPTUAL HASH 51
stored in the blacklist.
The goal is to prevent an adversary – who has access to the Image Registration and Sub-
mission functions – to find two perceptually similar images that will not yield a match via
the PH computation.
Our first task therefore is to formally define what a secure secret-key PH function is.
Definition 4.2.1. A private-key perceptual hash scheme SPH consists of three algorithms
as follows;
• The key generation algorithm kg that takes the security parameter 1n and outputs a
secret key k.
• The keyed perceptual hash function ph that takes an image I and the secret key k and
outputs a tag t.
• The keyed detection algorithm det that takes two tags and the secret key as input and
outputs a bit.
The corresponding Image Registration and Submission procedures are described in Figure
4.1.
We define a PH adversaryA as an efficient program which is allowed to arbitrarily interact
with the server using the Image Registration and Submission procedures.
Note that A has no access to the secret key k but each time she queries during image
registration or submission, she gains partial information about the secret key.
Let sim be a predicate defined over pair of images. This function is intended to model
”perceptually similar” pictures.
We say that a secret key perceptual hash scheme SPH is secure with respect to sim if no
PH adversary is able to find two images I, I ′ which are perceptually similar (sim(I, I ′) = 1)
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but are not detected as such by SPH (i.e. if t = phk(I) and t′ = phk(I ′) then detk(t, t′) = 0).
More formally for all PH adversaries A
Prob[k← kg(1n); (I, I ′)← A; sim(I, I ′) = 1;














1 ∃t ∈ DB ; detk(t ′, t) = 1
0 o.w.
b
Figure 4.1: Private-key perceptual hash SPH = (kg, ph, sim, det))
4.2.2 Public-Key Perceptual Hash Definition
As we discussed earlier, the problem with the private-key ph is that the client during Image
Registration must completely trust the platform and reveal her image.
We would like to have a public-key version of a perceptual hash scheme as follows:
• Setup: The platform (e.g., Facebook) generates a pair of secret-public key, and broad-
casts only the public key.
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• Image Registration: A client produces the tag of her image using the public key then
PH algorithm and sends the tag T to the server. The server stores T in the database.
• Image Submission: A user submits an image I, the server computes its tag and compares
it with the ones stored in the database.
More formally,
Definition 4.2.2. A public-key perceptual hash scheme PPH consists of three algorithms
as follows,
• The key generation algorithm KG that takes the security parameter 1n and outputs a
pair of secret key/public key (sk, pk).
• The perceptual hash function PH that takes the public key and an image and computes
a tag for the image.
• The Det algorithm that takes the secret key and two tags and decide if their underlying
images are similar.
The steps of the scheme are shown in Figure 4.2.
We say that a public key perceptual hash scheme PPH is secure with respect to Sim if
no PH adversary is able to find two images I, I ′ which are perceptually similar (Sim(I, I ′) =
1) but are not detected as such by PPH (i.e. if T = PHk(I) and T ′ = PHk(I ′) then
Detk(T, T
′) = 0). More formally for all PH adversaries A
Prob[(sk, pk)← KG(1n); (I, I ′)← A(pk); Sim(I, I ′) = 1;
T ← PHpk(I); T ′ ← PHpk(I ′); Detsk(T, T ′) = 0] = negl















1 ∃T ∈ DB ; Detsk(T ′,T ) = 1
0 otherwise
b
Figure 4.2: Public-key PHash PPH = (KG,PH, Sim,Det)
4.2.3 The Construction of Public-Key PHash from Private-Key
phash
In this section, we show how to construct a secure public-key perceptual hash scheme based
on a secure private-key one.
Our first attempt is to start from a secure private key perceptual hash SPH = (kg, ph, det)
and a fully homomorphic encryption scheme E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval).
Setup The key generation algorithm KG for the public key PH function will work as follows.
First it generates a secret key k ← kg for SPH and public/secret key pair for the FHE
(PK, SK)← KeyGen. It then encrypts k using PK: ck← EncPK(k). The public key for the
public-key perceptual hash consists of pk = [PK, ck]. The secret key is set to sk = [SK, k].
Image Registration During the registration phase, the client computes the function PH
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as follows. It runs the evaluation algorithm Eval on keyed ph, encrypted k and her image
I: T = EvalPK(ph, ck, I) which due to the property of FHE is T = EncPK(t = phk(I)). The
server using the FHE secret key SK, first decrypt the tag T and stores the underlying tag t
.
Image Submission At image submission the Det algorithm works as follows. When a
user (possibly an adversary) wants to upload a photo I ′, the server first computes its tag
t′ = phk(I
′) and compares it with all the keyed tags stored in the database. If it finds t such
that detk(t, t
′) = 1 it rejects, otherwise it accepts I ′.
The scheme1 is shown in more details in Figure 4.3.
If we try to prove the security of the scheme in Figure 4.3, we end up on a dead end. To
show the public-key perceptual hash scheme PPH is secure if the underlying keyed percep-
tual hash scheme SPH is secure, we try to build a reduction. We assume by contradiction
that the public-key scheme PPH = (KG,PH,Det) is not secure and there exists an efficient
adversary A which breaks it for a particular similarity function Sim. We need to build an
efficient adversary B that breaks the security of the secret-key scheme SPH = (kg, ph, det)).
An attempt to build algorithm B would work as follows: B is allowed to interact via
Image Registration and Submission with a private key k← kg(1n). It can run the public key
adversary A as a subroutine. The first thing that B has to do is to provide A with a public
key. B can generate PK for the FHE, but then does not really know what to encrypt for
ck = EncPK(k) since it does not know k. So it sets ck = EncPK(r) for some arbitrary value
r. It then provides A with pk = [PK, ck], which A accepts as it looks indistinguishable from
a real key due to the semantic security of the FHE.
Now B has to simulate the Image Registration and Submission public key procedures for
1Note that our construction is not exactly conforming to definition 4.2.2; We should technically store the
encrypted tag T , and then at image submission, the server would compute PH on I ′, i.e.another encrypted
tag, and then the Det algorithm would decrypt and compare. Our construction is equivalent and is more
efficient since it reduces the number of FHE operations.






sk := (SK, k) and pk := (PK, ck)
pk
EvalPK(ph, ck, I) = T
T
t = DecSK(T )








1 if ∃t ∈ DB ; detk(t ′, t) = 1
0 otherwise
b
Figure 4.3: Public-key PHash PPH = (KG,PH, Sim,Det)
A. It can easily simulate the Registration procedure since B does not have to provide any
output here. But B will get stuck in the simulation of the Image Submission procedures.
Here it is not clear how B can answer in a way consistent with an actual PH algorithm.
If B set r = k̂ for a correct secret key for SPH then it would be able to answer correctly.
But the deceptive answer of A would not be related to the actual key k that B wants to
break. On the other hand if r is arbitrary the simulation will not be indistinguishable at all,
as there may not even be a way to answer consistently.
The problem is that we need B to simulate an environment for A which implements the
PH with secret key k. But B has no information about k, though he is allowed to query its
own Image Registration and Submission with that key.
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The Correct Approach. To solve that problem we require the user during the Image
Registration phase to prove in a zero-knowledge way that he knows the image is registered.
The zero-knowledge part is required to preserve the privacy of the user (she still reveals
nothing about the image being registered). The proof of knowledge is needed to build a
successful reduction.
The scheme is described in Figure 4.4. Setup and Image Submission are identical to
the ones from the flawed scheme described above. Image Registration proceeds as before
but after the user submits T , the user and the server engage in a zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge of the image I such that T = EncPK(t = phk(I)).
Moving to the proof of security, the adversary B runs the adversary A on pk = [PK, ck],
where ck = EncPK(r) for some arbitrary value r.
At Image Registration, the adversary B extracts the image I being registered by A and
submits it via its own Image Registration oracle to the secret key SPH running under key
k that he is trying to break.
At Image Submission, when A submits I ′, the simulator B submits I ′ to its own Image
Submission oracle and relies its answer to A.
We note that the simulation produced by B is indistinguishable from a real execution in
which A ran against a PPH with secret key k. Indeed all the oracle queries are consistent
with k since B relies them to its own oracles (that use k), and the only difference between
a real execution and B’s simulation is in the public key. In a real execution ck = EncPK(k),
while in the simulation ck = EncPK(r) for some arbitrary value r. But this is easily shown to
be indistinguishable under the semantic security of the FHE scheme E . Figure 4.5 summarizes
the security proof.






sk := (SK, k) and pk := (PK, ck)
pk
EvalPK(ph, ck, I) = T
T + ZKPoK(I)
t = DecSK(T )








1 if ∃t ∈ DB ; detk(t ′, t) = 1
0 otherwise
b
Figure 4.4: Public-key PHash PPH = (KG,PH, Sim,Det)
Figure 4.5: Security Proof of the Public-Key PH From a Secret Key One.
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The above basically proves the following
Theorem 4.2.1. Assuming E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Eval) is a semantically secure FHE
scheme, and SPH = (kg, ph, det) a secure private-key perceptual hash scheme with respect
to the similarity function sim, then the public-key perceptual hash scheme described in Fig-
ure 4.4 is a secure public-key perceptual hash scheme with respect to the same similarity
function sim.
4.3 An Efficient Construction
We now show a particular example of PH function for which the above transformation can be
efficiently carried out, using only additively homomorphic encryption rather than FHE. We
first summarize the private-key perceptual hashing construction from [45], and then show
that it can be easily transformed into a public-key one.
4.3.1 Outline of the Algorithm
We refer the reader to [45] for a complete description and empirical analysis of the hash
function. Here, we summarize their method. For now we leave all the algorithm parameters
unspecified and discuss how to set them in Section 4.4. Their algorithm (specifically the
more robust “Scheme 2” in [45]) consists of the following steps. On input image I:
1. Preprocessing. After low-pass filtering, downsampling to a fixed size (512 × 512, as
suggested by [45]), and histogram equalization, a pixel matrix i(x, y) is obtained. A
Fourier transform is then applied. Let I(ρ, θ) denote the Fourier-transformed i(x, y),
in polar coordinates.
2. Feature Generation. The algorithm chooses m sets {Γj}j∈[m], where each ρ ∈ Γj is
uniformly chosen (without repetition) from the set of possible radii (determined by the
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size of the downsampled image). Each ρ is also associated with a random number βρ
(chosen according to a Gaussian distribution). The secret key is used for the random
selections of ρ ∈ Γj and βρ.
The algorithm then takes a βρ-weighted combination for ρ ∈ Γj of summations of the













∣∣∣∣I(ρ, (2i+ 1)πK )
∣∣∣∣ (4.1)
yielding a feature vector [h1, . . . , hm].
3. Post Processing. Quantization and compression are performed on the feature vector
obtained above, and a permutation (derived from the key) is applied to the compressed
result.
4.3.2 Evaluation on an Encrypted Key
We first point out that the Preprocessing Step does not involve any use of the secret key, so
we assume that the client performs it before any interaction with the Server.
To implement our transformation, the Server has to provide an encryption of the secret
key. As we pointed out above, during Feature Generation the secret key is used to generate
the βρ values and to select which ρ ∈ Γj. Let
βρ,j =

βρ if ρ ∈ Γj
0 else.
The public key of the scheme will be a Paillier public key together with Paillier encryptions
β̂ρ,j of βρ,j for each radius ρ and each j ∈ [m].









cρ mod N2 (4.2)
where ĥj is a Paillier encryption of the j-th entry of the feature vector [hj]. The client sends
the encrypted vector [ĥj] to the Server together with a ZKPoK of the values cρ (described
below).
The server can now decrypt the feature vector and proceed with the Post Processing
phase (which includes the secret key, but can be done without interacting with the client).
The ZKPoK proof. Dropping the index j, the client has to prove that he knows a vector






This is a standard proof of knowledge of the representation of ĥ with respect to basis [β̂ρ]
which can be performed as follows
• The Client computes R̂ =
∏u
ρ=1(β̂ρ)
rρ mod N2 for values rρ ∈R ZN .
• The Server sends a random challenge e ∈R ZN .
• The Client answers with sρ = rρ + ecρ mod N .
• The Server checks that
∏u
ρ=1(β̂ρ)
sρ = R̂ĥe mod N2.
4.4 Implementation and Analysis
In this section we explore the efficiency of the scheme in Section 4.3 through implementation
tests. As we show below, with some careful optimization much of the computation on
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encrypted values can be vectorized, making the cryptographic overhead of transforming the
algorithm in [45] from private-key to public-key rather modest. This yields a highly efficient
scheme in practice.
4.4.1 Parameter Settings
In our implementation we had to decide how to set the parameters in [45] where many of
them had been left unspecified2.
The only parameter set in [45] was K = 360. For the value m (the length of the feature
vector) we chose m = 23 (the reason for this choice is explained below). Somewhat arbitrarily
we set the size of every Γj to 3 and chose the distribution of the βρ as a Gaussian with mean
µ = 50 and variance σ = 10.
We have no way of guaranteeing that with this choice of parameters the algorithm in [45]
will display the remarkable robustness properties shown in the implentation tests of [45].
However in our implementation tests the algorithm performed reasonably well against many
image manipulations.
We stress however that the goal of our experiments was to quantify the cost of the
cryptographic overhead of the “private to public key” transformation. On that front, the
choice of parameters has a minimal effect and we are confident that our timings are valid
regardless of how one chooses the parameters above.
The only difference would be if we need to increase the legth of the feature vector. We
point out that the final hash in [45] was 400 bits long. This implies an extraction of about
18 bits from each feature of the vector if m = 23 which we believe is reasonable. In any
case the timings reported below can be adjusted by a multiplicative factor of λ for a feature
vector of length 23λ.
2We repeatedly contacted the authors of [45] to inquire about how they had set those parameters in
their implementation but received no answer. We were not able to locate the code used in [45] for their
experiments either.
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4.4.2 Optimizations
Perhaps the most important optimization from the basic description in Section 4.3 comes
from the observation that there is a lot of extra “space” in each ciphertext. This allows us to
vectorize the computation, thereby reducing the work by a substantial factor. The plaintext
group for Paillier is ZN , where N is an integer of at least 1024 bits, which as we will show is
much larger than the values βρ and hj to be encoded in ciphertexts. Let us compute bounds
on hj. First note that with high probability, βρ ≤ 128
def
= Mβ for each ρ (these values were
normally distributed with µ = 50, σ = 10), and thus we can force βρ ≤ 128 via rejection
sampling without noticeably impacting the performance or security of the hash function.
Let s denote the width of the scaled image. Then from Parseval’s formula and the Cauchy












Given the maximal (grayscale) pixel value of 255, and given that the image is scaled to
512×512 during preprocessing, we have cρ ≤ 255 ·5123 = 34225520640
def
= Mc, which we note




βρcρ ≤Mβ ·Mc · |Γj| < B. (4.4)
Let ` = blogB(N)c so that B` ≤ N (this ensures that any base B, `-digit number will be
smaller than N). Concretely, we would have ` = 23 for any 1024 bit modulus, given our
setting of |Γj| = 3 and thus B = 13142599925761. We can now modify the scheme as follows:
3We note that the seemingly crude estimate cρ ≤ K · s2 · 255 is actually better if K ≤ s.
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Note that upon decryption of ĥ, the server will find a feature vector of length ` encoded in
the base B digits of the result. The bound in (4.4) ensures that no “carries” occur in any of
the base B digits. This provides a factor of ` speedup, which is substantial. As mentioned,
for our settings ` = 23, but even for large values of |Γj|, we would still have ` ≥ 20. Lastly,
we note that the proof of knowledge in §4.3.2 works identically in this situation, just using
η̂ρ in place of β̂ρ.
Depending on the parameters, some additional optimizations are also possible. If m is
large (and hence the product in (4.6) must be computed repeatedly), addition chains can
be precomputed for the exponents cρ, reducing the number of multiplications required for
each exponentiation. Furthermore, to compute the long sequence of multiplications in the
product, intermediate values could be kept in Montgomery form until the end. Also note
that for small values of ρ, the sum cρ is “degenerate” in the sense that there will be far
fewer than K distinct pixel values at radius ρ. Thus it may be sensible for the server to
publicly constrain the range of radii that will be used so that each Γj ⊂ [l, u] for l = dK/2πe,
thereby improving the client’s efficiency. This somewhat increases an adversary’s ability
to find images with colliding hashes, however in our main applications we are far more
concerned with the opposite problem of an adversary producing non-colliding hashes from
similar images.
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4.4.3 Analysis and Benchmarks
We consider here the cost of our scheme relative to the original work of [45], which must
be privately evaluated by the server. As the image preprocessing (the computation of cρ)
is identical for our scheme as that of [45], we focus our analysis on the additional work
performed by our client, which is essentially the work to compute the product in (4.6).
Lastly, we compare this additional work to the total cost of computing the perceptual hash.
Analysis. We begin with an asymptotic analysis of the cost in terms of the security
parameter and the size of the downsampled image. Let s denote the width in pixels of
the scaled image (which we take to be square). For the unoptimized version, a client in
our scheme must compute ĥj for j ∈ [m] as in (4.2). Since cρ = O(poly(s)) as shown
in (4.3), we see that an upper bound on the number of modular multiplications would be
O(ms log(cρ)) = O(ms log(s)), using any efficient algorithm for modular exponentiation
(e.g., square and multiply). Applying the main optimization from Section 4.4.2, m effec-
tively drops out of the equation,4 as we now compute the single product in (4.6). Letting
λ = logN , where N is the modulus used by Paillier, then the cost of our optimized scheme
is now O(s log(s)λ2), even with a naive O(λ2) method for multiplication of long integers.
The proof of knowledge is a similar computation to that of ĥ, however the exponents are
much larger (random elements of ZN). Since λ certainly upper bounds log(s), the cost of
the overhead for the full scheme (including the PoK) is O(sλ3). As for the size of keys,
the server’s private key can simply be the seed for a pseudorandom function. However, the
public key will be O(msλ) bits. With our concrete setting of parameters, public keys are
approximately 65KB.
4We can think of m in this case as being determined by the security parameter of the encryption scheme.
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Benchmarks. For benchmarking we wrote a C/C++ prototype of the algorithm, making
use of the CImg library [46] for the image pre-processing phase, and libpaillier [5] for
handling Paillier encryption. For our settings of parameters (and indeed for most reasonable
settings), we found that the scheme (with optimizations) does not dramatically increase
the cost of computing the hash. By far, the most expensive element of our computation is
the proof of knowledge, but even this takes less than 600ms on our test machine (a 2011
laptop). The preprocessing phase of an image of around 3500 pixels wide equals the cost of
the overhead of our scheme. These results are summarized in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Pre-processing cost (grayscale; gaussian blur; histogram equalization; FFT) vs
additional work for computing on encrypted data (client’s overhead).
4.5 Conclusion and Future Work
First, we defined the notion of cryptographic perceptual hashing. Then, We showed that
the construction of publicly evaluatable perceptual hash schemes can be feasible using FHE.
Later, we used Paillier’s encryption to move toward a practical construction. We showed
the security of our construction; if the underlying keyed perceptual hash is secure then the
public-key one is secure. So, our proposed construction adds no ambiguity to the security
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of the perceptual hashing algorithm. We used a specific keyed PH function in [45], but
our techniques can lead to a publicly evaluatable version of other perceptual hash schemes
used in practice such as PhotoDNA. This leads to the design of systems that help reining in
online abuse over social media and encourage users to participate in the creation of blacklist
databases to stop the spread of non-consensual intimate imagery. Finding applications for
the publicly evaluatable PH and applying our scheme is an interesting avenue of research.
This will be a great motivation to work on the efficiency of the construction as well.
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